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JOHN MARSHALL, "THE CHIEF JUSTICE"t
Herbert Brownell, Jr.*
We commemorate this year the 200th anniversary of the birth of John
Marshall, our most renowned Chief Justice.
Born 1755, in what is now Fauquier County, Virginia, John Marshall
was nominated by President John Adams, unanimously confirmed, and
on January 31, 1801, at the age of 45, commissioned as our fourth Chief
Justice. If President Adams had done nothing else, he could rest his
fame upon that single act.
In Marshall's day, the judges usually boarded in the same house and
dined together. It was their custom to allow themselves wine only when
it was raining. But the Chief justice was brought up, as was said in
jest, on Federalism and Madeira. Occasionally on a sunshiny day, he
would say "Brother Story, will you step up to the window and see if
there are signs of rain?" Reluctantly Story would be obliged to report
there was none. Thereupon the Chief Justice would reply cheerfully:
"Well, this is a very large territory over which we have jurisdiction and
I feel sure it is raining in some part of it."
There are many other anecdotes which describe Marshall, the man,
the patriot, the statesman. But today I would like to speak of Marshall,
the Chief Justice, and the distinction with which he graced this office for
34 years until his death in 1835.
His significant contributions in strengthening our constitutional structure were many: in securing for the judiciary its rightful place of equal
dignity with the legislative and executive branches; in establishing judicial review of both federal and state laws; in laying the foundation for
a strong national government of laws and making it supreme in its
field; in giving the commerce clause a construction which permitted and
stimulated the unhampered growth of the country; in assuring continued
stability of the country by protection of personal and property rights
from governmental trespass; and in his exposition of the rights of nations
under international law.
Above all these lasting achievements, Marshall's outstanding contribution was to make the judiciary a respected, independent and coordinate
branch of our Government.
t This article is the substance of an address by the Hon. Herbert Brownell, Jr., Attorney
General of the United States, delivered before a meeting of the National Association of
Attorneys General, Bretton Woods, N. H., September 14, 1955, and printed by permission
of the author.
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 105, for biographical data.
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When Marshall took his seat as Chief Justice of the United States in
1801, the prestige of the Court was so low that it was difficult to obtain
a leading lawyer to take the position.
John Jay had hesitated to accept the position of Chief Justice when
Washington offered it to him in 1789. Subsequently he resigned to become a candidate for Governor of New York. Jay later refused reappointment because the national judiciary was hopelessly weak and
Congress was unwilling to relieve the justices of the onerous duty of
sitting in the circuit courts. Upon Jay's resignation, the position was
offered to both Patrick Henry and William Cushing and refused by both.
Rutledge resigned as Associate Justice to become Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of South Carolina. Harrison of Maryland chose to select
a chancellorship of Maryland in preference to a seat on the Court.
The inferior position to which the Court had sunk was shown in other
ways. When the Government moved to Washington in 1800, there was
extravagant provision made for both the executive and legislative departments but the judiciary was treated indifferently. Until 1819 it had no
home of its own. After opening its first term, the Senate consented to
accommodate the Supreme Court in one of its committee rooms. This
was an undignified room 24 by 30 feet in size on the first floor of the
Capitol. The Supreme Court was later pushed into a basement room,
which was described as a "mere potato hole of a place." At first, it did
not even have a reporter. Before Marshall became Chief Justice, its
reports were published as an appendix to the reports of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania. During its first three years, the Court had decided no cases on their merits. During its first eleven years it had disposed of no more than 40 cases.
In sum, the Supreme Court in 1801 had neither funds, patronage,
prestige, nor adequate quarters. But of all essential things, it lacked
leadership most. The prior Chief Justices had not even devoted their
full time to the work of the Court. Since each Justice read his own
opinion-even if in basic accord on the reasoning and conclusion-it
brought into prominence points of disagreement thus creating in the
public mind the impression that the judiciary was weak and disunited.
The people being traditionally hostile to authority were also none too
friendly to federal judges. They resented particularly their enforcement
of the revenue collecting authority and the hated sedition laws which
deprived them of liberty of speech and press.
Thus, as Marshall came to the bench, there was no popular support
for the Supreme Court or for that matter any part of the federal courts.
In addition, Marshall had to contend with hostility in both the legis-
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lative and executive branches of the Government. Marshall stood for the
party of conservatism, of order, of centralized authority. Jefferson, inaugurated in 1801, was leader of the opposition forces and a strong exponent of states' rights. Most of all, he distrusted the national courts,
fearing their encroachment on his executive powers, and the liberties of
the people. The Congress, composed of staunch supporters of state
power, were equally opposed to a powerful federal judiciary which might
whittle down the sovereign rights of the states. It was in this unfavorable and foreboding setting that Marshall took his seat as Chief Justice.
The occasion soon arose to assert the independence of the Court and
Marshall was quick to make the most of it.
The case arose in this way. Just before his term expired, President
Adams appointed forty-two persons to be justices of the peace for the
counties of Washington and Alexandria in the District of Columbia.
These commissions were confirmed by the Senate. Although the commissions were signed and sealed, they were not delivered. After Jefferson
was inaugurated as President, he directed Madison, then Secretary of
State, to issue commissions to twenty-five of the persons appointed by
Adams but to withhold the commissions from the other seventeen.
Marbury and three others whose 'commissions were withheld applied to
the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions.
At the time the case of Marbury v. Madiso-1 was finally heard in
1803, the Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction under the Act of 1789.
This Act of Congress conferred authority upon the Court to entertain
a mandamus suit. However, while the Constitution conferred upon the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction in specified cases, a suit for mandamus was not one of those specifically mentioned.
Marshall realized that if he directed Madison to deliver the commission and the latter ignored the order, the executive and judicial departments would have been in direct conflict. In this situation, the advantage
lay with the executive branch since the Court had no physical means
of compelling execution of its order. Marshall also knew that if the
Court were unable to enforce its order, it would soon be the laughing
stock of the nation. On the other hand, Marshall was aware that if the
Court dismissed the case, it might be urged that it had done so for lack
of authority to invalidate acts of Congress. Faced with these unsatisfactory alternatives, Marshall prevailed on his associates to declare the
Act of 1789 invalid on the ground that it conferred jurisdiction upon
1

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus contrary to the Constitution.

Having decided that the Act of Congress was repugnant to the Constitution, the next question was whether the Court was nevertheless
obliged to give the Act effect. This proposition Marshall declared was
"an absurdity too gross to be insisted on." 2 He stated that it was "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is"; 3 that "if both the law and constitution apply to a particular
case .. the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case,"4 and if the two collide the Constitution must be supreme
over the laws of Congress. The Constitution expressly stated that the
supreme law of the land shall be the Constitution itself and only those
laws of the United States which shall be made "in pursuance" of the
Constitution. Thus, Marshall concluded, the Constitution "confirms
and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written
constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that
courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.1 5
By this decision, Marshall established for all time the authority of the
federal courts to pass on the validity of acts of Congress.
Today we are surprised that anyone would have even questioned the
authority of the Federal Court to declare an Act of Congress to be
invalid. But in early days our lawyers were trained in English law under
which Parliament was almost omnipotent. There were no precedents for
the holding in this or in other countries. The contrary view was widely
held by men of stature such as Jefferson who felt that each department
of government should pass on its own exercise of authority. Jefferson
and his supporters therefore looked upon the decision as a despotic
usurpation of power by the Court. Today we realize there would be
little, if anything, left of our constitutional rights, if the courts were
not our guardians against invalid legislation.
There was another principle announced in Marbury v. Madison which
had far-reaching importance. The Court speaking through its Chief
Justice said that mandamus was an appropriate legal remedy to compel
a government official to perform a specific legal duty which was neither
political nor discretionary in character. Marshall aptly observed that
the assertion of this principle characterized "a government of laws, and
not of men."6 As this principle has been applied by our courts, no man
2

Id. at 177.

3 Ibid.
4 Id. at 178.
5 Id. at 180.
6 Id. at 163.
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in this country is so high that he is above the law, no official may defy
the law, and all officers of the government from the highest to the lowest
are bound by it.
This decision and those that followed established the Supreme Court
as the protector of the fundamental law, and of the rights and liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution. The power thus exercised remains today
as one of our greatest bulwarks against tyrannical action either by the
legislative or executive departments.
Marbury v. Madison was the first great step in restoring the prestige
and dignity of the Court. It also marked a procedural departure for the
Court. For the first time in its history the Court began its new practice
of announcing its rulings through one justice, and in the majority of its
important constitutional decisions thereafter the opinions were delivered
by Marshall himself.
With firmer footing thus established and Marshall's inspiring leadership, the Supreme Court was called on to resolve one of its most vexing
and difficult problems. This was the task of reconciling federal supremacy within its sphere under the Constitution with the reserved
rights of the states.
Marshall's experiences at Valley Forge had taught him that our country could never be strong so long as the nation's needs were subordinated
to local and sectional interests. It was his abiding ambition to see the
proud, independent states welded together into what, in 1868, Chief
Justice Chase best described as "an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States."'
His opportunity to help cement the union of states and to achieve
greater stability for the nation arose in McCulloc v. Maryland.' Here
the primary question was whether the State of Maryland was empowered
to tax the notes issued by the Baltimore Branch of the Bank of the
United States. The other question was whether the national government had authority to charter the Bank and to permit it to establish
branches within the State.
In order to understand the significance of this case, we must consider it in its setting. The first Bank of the United States was established in 1791. It was conservatively managed. It had been a powerful, restraining influence on speculation and loose financing practices. It
had helped immeasurably to stabilize the national currency. But it was
precisely because of its pervasive influence throughout the country and
7 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)

8 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

700, 725 (1868).
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its high standards that it produced many enemies among state and private
banks where practices were loose and reckless.
As a result of hostility to it the Bank lost its charter in 1811, and it
was not until 1816 that it was rechartered. In the period in which it was
out of existence, wildcat banking had become the common practice
throughout the nation. The abuses were great, and the social evils almost disastrous. Bank charters were issued wholesale, so free from restrictions as to constitute little more than licenses to plunder the people.
Money was borrowed on the most liberal terms. There was wide speculation in land and in every kind of venture. When the speculative bubble
burst, the banks found that they had far more paper outstanding than
they could ever redeem. It also turned out that many of these local
banks had resorted to every conceivable method of fraud in issuing
this paper. The usual consequences followed. The banks repudiated the
paper. There was universal bankruptcy. Business stagnated and came
to an end. There was unemployment, distress, pauperism, and crime.
The general public looked about for a scapegoat and placed the responsibility on the Bank of the United States. Many state legislatures
took drastic action in attempts to interfere with the operation of the
National Bank. This was done through laws outlawing any but state
banks and through excessive taxes to discourage national branches. It
was in this hostile climate that McCulloch v. Maryland was heard in
1819. Three days after the extended arguments were completed, Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court upholding the authority of Congress
to charter and control the Bank as a federal agency, denying the right
of the state to interfere with the Federal Government by taxing such an
agency, and ruling the state tax to be invalid.
First, Marshall took up the state's argument that it could tax the
Bank of the United States, a federal institution. The State of Maryland
claimed that the powers of the federal government had been delegated
by the states, who alone are sovereign; and, therefore, the federal power
must be exercised in subordination of the states. Rejecting this contention, Marshall declared that: "The Government of the Union . . . is,

emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In form and substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are
to be exercised ... for their benefit."9 Speaking for the Court, Marshall
proclaimed for all time that "the government of the Union, though limIt is the
ited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action ....
government of all; ... it represents all, and acts for all."' 0
) Id. at 404-05.
Id. at 405.
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Marshall also overruled the state's argument that the United States
lacked power to charter the Bank or to establish branches within the
states since the Constitution did not specifically confer this authority.
True, the enumerated powers did not refer to "bank" or "incorporation."
But power was granted to lay and collect taxes; to raise and support
armies and navies. And Congress had the power to make all laws "necessary and proper" for carrying the powers expressly granted into execution. Now what was meant by the word "necessary," Marshall asked?
He recognized that where the happiness and prosperity of a nation
so vitally depend on the proper execution of powers that are granted, the
means must be ample for that purpose. This was a Constitution he
declared "intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs."" Finally, Marshall
summed up the matter with this guiding principle:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional. 12
Having found that Congress had authority to incorporate the Bank
of the United States, the Court then concluded that the state within
which the Bank was established could not tax it. As Marshall declared
in words now so well known: " . . . [T]he power to tax involves the
13
power to destroy."
If the state could tax the Bank, Marshall argued, it could tax the
mail, the mint, patent rights, judicial process. It could tax all the means
employed by the Government to such an extent that it would soon defeat
the ends of government. The American people did not intend this,
Marshall said. "What the Constitution has joined together, let no State
put asunder."
The importance of this decision was immediate and widespread. Reaction differed widely with support in the north and east and condemnation in the west and south where there was greater financial distress. As
we now know, in upholding the powers of the National Bank, Marshall
gave impetus to more conservative banking, to stabilization of the national currency, and to facilitation of sounder trade and exchange practices throughout the country.
With the passing of the years, Marshall continued to counsel the
people to avoid their disastrous passion for pulling in several different dill

Id. at 419.
12 Id. at 421.
13 Id. at 431.
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rections and thus inviting ruin. He seized the opportunity in Cohens v.
Virginia4 to stress this point. The question was whether the Supreme
Court had jurisdiction to reverse the judgment of a state court where a
federal question was involved. In a unanimous decision for the Court,
Marshall upheld the authority of the United States courts to review
and revise state judgments which were contrary to the Constitution and
laws of the United States.
In reaching this conclusion, Marshall sharply rejected the contention
of the State of Virginia that the decision of the various state courts on
matters involving construction of the Federal Constitution and federal
laws should be final, and that the Constitution did not make the federal
courts the ultimate arbiters in such cases.
In memorable language, recalling that the Constitution was "framed
for ages to come,'15 Marshall pressed home the lesson of unity and
strength through the over-all direction of a central government in matters of national concern, by saying:
The American States, as well as the American people, have believed a
close and firm Union to be essential to their liberty and to their happiness.
They have been taught by experience, that this Union cannot exist, without a government for the whole; and they have been taught by the same
experience that this government would be a mere shadow, that must disappoint all their hopes, unless invested with large portions of that sovereignty which belongs to independent states.16
Consider for a moment what confusion and chaos would have prevailed in our country if there were as many interpretations of our Constitution as there are states, without a court of last resort like our
Supreme Court to resolve intense conflicts. An act would be lawful under
our Constitution in one state, and illegal when one stepped over the
boundary into another state. Reprisal and resort to hostile means rather
than the peaceful forum of the Court would have been inevitable. Obviously the Constitution would have been a dead letter in many of its
important applications if Marshall had not maintained its supremacy
over conflicting state legislation and state court rulings.
There was still another essential link to be forged in creating a single,
indivisible nation. It required interstate and foreign commerce to be
placed under the complete control of Congress, free from interference
and discrimination by the states. Gibbons v. Ogden,"7 decided in 1824,
gave Marshall the opportunity to expound upon the scope of national
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
Ir Id. at 387.
16 Id. at 380.
17 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
14
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authority and the limitations upon the states implied in the power conferred upon the Congress, "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations
and among the Several States." It was Marshall's own opinion that this
decision did more to knit the American people into a united nation than
any other one force in our history, except war.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, the New York legislature had granted an exclusive right to Livingston and Fulton to navigate the waters of the
state by steam vessels. Those who violated this grant ran the risk of
having their boats forfeited. The holders of the exclusive right sought
to enjoin Gibbons from operating his steamships between New Jersey
and New York. The Court of Appeals for the State of New York sustained the monopoly grant in face of Gibbons' contention that it was
repugnant to the "commerce" clause of the Constitution, and contrary
to the Acts of Congress regulating the coastwise trade. Marshall decided
against the monopoly upon the ground that it was in conflict with the
Acts of Congress regulating the coasting trade.
In reaching this decision, Marshall gave the widest possible range to
the words "commerce" and "regulate." They are as broad as the exigencies which require protection of interstate commerce from any outside
interference, he concluded.
This decision had far-reaching consequences. The principles laid down
in the case became integral to our whole constitutional framework and
furthered the cause of federal supremacy in a vital area of national
activity.
The economic consequences of setting aside the monopoly were equally
great. Piqued at the exclusive New York grant, Connecticut, New Jersey,
and Ohio had already engaged in retaliatory legislation. Apprehension
over monopoly controls was also rising in the west. Commercial wars,
barriers, and tension of this kind which contributed to national disunity
and discord were precisely the defects of the league of states that the
framers of the Constitution had intended to avert. This was the happy
precedent by which the entire country grew.
Our vast interstate and foreign commerce has since been left unfettered. Commerce on land, water, rail, telegraph, and telephone knows
no state lines, barriers, border duties, or retaliatory measures such as
have hindered commerce abroad all these years. Marshall's wisdom and
foresight gave great momentum to the development of all forms of interstate transportation and communication, and tended to bind together all
the states into one united, harmonious nation. In our country, unlike
others, it was not the strength of the sword which has held us together,
but merely the strength of the Constitution.
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Although Marshall's decision involving the commerce clause was directed to removing all barriers to free trade between the states, as well
as between the nation and foreign countries, he never lost sight of the
need for accommodating competing demands of state and national interests.
As a Virginian, Marshall realized that the states alone could most
effectively regulate local problems because they had the intimate knowledge and practical experience to deal with diverse and unique local conditions. Thus, while Marshall did not hesitate to strike down state regulation of interstate commerce, he gave every encouragement to appropriate
exercise by the states of their police powers in safeguarding vital local interests, such as health, safety, welfare, and property.
There was one other matter of significance which seriously engaged
the continuing interest and attention of Marshall. It was his profound
respect for property rights. There were sound reasons for his interest.
He knew that protection of property was indispensable to the protection
of human rights. The history of revolution in France had taught Marshall that a nation's stability depended in large measure on adequate
protection of a citizen's property rights. He was fully aware that the
framers of the Constitution were intensely concerned about property
rights. Based on bitter experience during colonial days, they took the
precaution in the Constitution, even prior to the amendments, of barring
the states from enacting laws impairing the obligation of contracts.
In the Dartmouth College case,18 decided in 1819, Marshall gave effect
to this key provision of the Constitution. Marshall, speaking for the
Court, held that the charter of the college was a contract which could
not be materially altered nor revoked by the State of New Hampshire
without the consent of the college.
The impact of this decision upon the states was thereafter avoided
by express reservation permitting revision or revocation of a grant. But
the principles laid down were of lasting value.
This decision was of particular significance to the country's educational and business development. It put private institutions of learning
and charity out of the reach of state legislative and executive despots.
It gave corporate investors a sense of security in their investments. This
was of particular importance at a time when there was already underway
the westward march of development from the Alleghenies to the Pacific.
Development of natural resources in the states called for capital from
both domestic and foreign investors. Investments into these unexplored
fields were encouraged because the decision allayed fears of investors
18 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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that the states would repudiate their contracts and other obligations.
The decision also lent considerable stability to commercial transactions
generally and inspired confidence throughout the business world. It
taught the people that faith once pledged could not be breached by state
legislation or other state action. In addition, the decision strengthened
the allegiance of investors and businessmen to the national government.
As Marshall lay the foundation for a granite-like constitutional structure at home, he was mindful as well of the need for asserting the
integrity and strength of our young nation in its foreign relationships.
Again and again, the Court in decisions by Marshall insisted that this
nation must abide by the rules of the game which prevailed in the field
of international law if it was to find acceptance among the family of
nations. Regardless of the administration in power, Marshall insisted
on strictest fidelity of the United States to the provisions of treaties, upon
the honest observance by neutrals of their international duties, and upon
the doctrine of the equality of nations. As he said in the Antelope case: 9
"No principle . . . is more universally acknowledged than the perfect
equality of nations ....[N] o nation can.., make a law of nations.... 1120
International law having been incorporated into American jurisprudence,
Marshall took every opportunity to expound and expand it as usage,
custom, equity, and natural justice required. His opinions found favor
in the judgment of the civilized world, and enhanced his reputation both
at home and abroad. They helped also to maintain the foreign relations
of our country on a high and honorable level and contributed greatly
to the preservation of peace with other nations.
In these many ways, Marshall courageously and cogently established
principles and precedents upon which the integrity and ordered growth
of the nation have always rested; upon which human rights have been
protected; upon which our freedom has been preserved. Indispensable
to these favorable conditions for securing "the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity" was an independent judiciary which Marshall inspired, exercising all its great powers with self-restraint, fearlessly and without regard to public clamor or passion.
In the courtroom of the Supreme Court there is a beautifully carved
stone frieze. It teaches that law is an age-old product of human experience. On the south wall there are nine law givers who lived before Christ.
These are Menes, Hammurabi, Moses, Solomon, Lycurgus, Solon, Draco,
Confucius, and Octavian. On the north wall there are nine equally
great legal leaders who lived after Christ-Justinian, Mohammed,
19 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
20 Id. at 122.
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Charlemagne, King John of England, St. Louis of France, Hugo Grotius,
Blackstone, Napoleon, and John Marshall.
By this signal and unprecedented honor, the people of America memorialized John Marshall. He stands side by side with the greatest
lawmakers that mankind has ever produced. How well their lofty tribute
accords with the words of Mr. Justice Holmes who once said: " . . . if

American law were to be represented by a single figure, sceptic and worshipper alike would agree without dispute that the figure could be but
one alone, and that one John Marshall." 1
21 Supplement, 178 Mass. 619, 627 (1901); also reprinted in Holmes, Speeches 87, 90
(1934).

